Work disability is a key challenge for social protection systems in advanced industrialised countries. The last few decades have seen reforms to sickness and disability policies in many OECD countries, with the aim of supporting workers with health impairments, ensuring an adequate labour supply and reducing spending on social protection programmes. The OECD has documented a convergence in sickness and disability policies across countries. This convergence consists of a shift in policy focus from passive income maintenance to employment incentives and reintegration policies (OECD, 2003a (OECD, ,b, 2010 Prinz & Thompson, 2009 ). Scharle, V aradi, and Samu (2015) found that this applies also to post-socialist member states of the EU, and that the trend has not been reversed in the postcrisis years. In contrast, other studies have stressed the cross-country heterogeneity in policy design and reform strategies (Burkhauser, Daly, McVicar, & Wilkins, 2014; Milligan & Wise, 2011; Morris, 2016; Vossen & van Gestel, 2015) .
A thorough understanding of policy developments is a prerequisite for the investigation of the underlying reform dynamics as well as for the explanation of trends in outcomes such as disability benefit enrolment and employment rates. This study contributes to the understanding of policy settings and reform trajectories by providing quantitative and qualitative information for tracking changes and comparing countries over time. We used detailed policy scores developed by the OECD for the period 1990 to 2007 and updated them to the year 2014 to highlight salient trends as well as to discuss and compare policy changes since 1990. In a second step, we used the updated policy scores to investigate country clusters in sickness and disability policy. Our study enriches previous findings (OECD, 2010) by covering a longer period and providing a more detailed picture of the evolution of country clusters over a longer time. We have also methodically improved previous work, which was based on hierarchical clustering methods, by using model-based cluster analysis. Model-based clustering allows formal inference in contrast to the largely heuristic hierarchical cluster methods.
Our analysis shows that long-term trends towards retrenchment, stricter benefit conditionality and stronger employment support have continued unabated in the most recent period. Looking at the detailed policy subdimensions and differences across countries, however, we find a nuanced picture. Farreaching reforms were concentrated to a subset of countries. Moreover, we find that the number of distinct country clusters has increased over time, which suggests more rather than less variation in policy. Variation can be found along several dimensions, such as the scope of rehabilitation policies, focus on monitoring and early intervention, strength of incentives for benefit recipients and the role attributed to employers and stakeholders. A group of Continental European countries, together with Scandinavian countries, emerged from the reform processes with a distinctive combination of compensation and integration policies. This policy shift can be interpreted against the backdrop of functional and institutional factors, but also within a more general shift in the understanding of welfare state objectives and the role of social protection.
Dimensions of sickness and disability policy
For our quantitative analysis of disability policies and their reforms for working-age people, we used a data set generated by the OECD for the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] and expanded it to 2014 for a subsample of 20 countries. The OECD has classified disability policies based on two policy indicators, each consisting of ten subdimensions. The first indicator provides an overall assessment of policy features related to the benefit system, i.e., the compensation dimension, while the second captures the intensity of measures for activation and employment integration, i.e., the integration dimension (OECD, 2010) . Each of the 20 subcomponents was measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 5 and both indicators therefore had a maximum of 50 points. (See Appendix A for details.)
The compensation dimension includes aspects such as the coverage and level of disability benefits, the minimum degree of incapacity needed for benefit and full benefit entitlement, the type of medical and vocational assessment, as well as information on sickness benefits. The integration dimension considers, among other things, the complexity and consistency of benefits and support systems, the degree of employer obligations towards their employees, the timing and extent of vocational rehabilitation and the existence of work incentives for beneficiaries. A higher score on the compensation indicator implies a more generous policy. An increase in the integration dimension signals a more active and employment-oriented policy; a reduction in the compensation dimension can be interpreted as welfare state retrenchment.
Overall, the indicators developed by the OECD are comprehensive and well-suited to provide a detailed picture of policy differences and developments across countries and over time. However, the index does not account for all facets of disability policy. For instance, employment protection and antidiscrimination legislation, as well as regulations concerning part-time sick leave and other activation measures, are not covered by the scores. The focus of the OECD's classification is on policy areas that affect the workforce directly. Other areas, such as education, are not taken into consideration. This creates scope for future research, and it also cautions us not to equate a lack of change in policy scores with an overall lack of reform activity.
The OECD (2010) applied hierarchical clustering to the data for 2007 and identified three main country groups characterised by particular sets of policies, and several subgroups within these. The main classification had a broad, albeit incomplete, overlap with the welfare regime taxonomy of the 'Liberal', the 'Corporatist' and the 'Social democratic' worlds of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990 ). Based on this classification, the OECD found considerable convergence in the compensation dimension and a consistent trend -despite persistent differences -in the evolution of the integration dimension between 1990 and 2007. Taken together, this was interpreted as evidence for the persistence of distinct policy models within a context of increasing similarity between clusters.
To update the policy scores, we applied the categories proposed by the OECD (see Appendix A) to policy changes that took place after 2007.
1 The necessary information was collected through desk-top research and for some countries, validation with the help of country experts. Table B1 in Appendix B contains a detailed overview of the changes that we applied to the OECD scores between 2007 and 2014. For Finland and Poland, we relied on Scharle et al. (2015) who did not find any relevant policy changes in these two countries after 2007. We analysed data for 1990-2014 and focussed particularly on four points in time: 1990, 2000, 2007 and 2014. 2 In this way, we aimed to identify country clusters as well as reform trajectories over time.
Methods
In order to cluster OECD countries based on their disability policies, we followed recent examples in the literature (Beblav y, Thum, & Veselkova, 2013; Danforth, 2014 ) and used a model-based clustering approach (Fraley & Raftery, 2002 is based on the idea that observations can be grouped by their distance from each other. Ideally, the clusters should exhibit high internal homogeneity, i.e., groups should contain similar observations, as well as high external heterogeneity, i.e., observations that are dissimilar should be in different groups (Danforth, 2014) . One widely used method to identify clusters is agglomerative hierarchical clustering, also used by the OECD (2010). This method allows separating observations into clusters without determining the number of clusters beforehand. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is largely heuristic and therefore not suited for strong inferences. In contrast, model-based clustering is wellgrounded in probability theory and statistically rigorous in the identification of clusters. In this approach, the problems of determining the number of clusters and of choosing an appropriate clustering method are recast as a statistical problem of model choice (Fraley & Raftery, 2002) . The central assumption of a model-based cluster analysis is that the observations are generated by a finite mixture of probability distributions (Danforth, 2014) . Clusters can then be defined as groups of objects that belong to the same probability distribution. Model-based clustering is typically more conservative than agglomerative hierarchical clustering in the identification of groups, as it is based on statistical tests of differences between the observations. We followed the approach proposed by Raftery (1998, 2002) and set the maximum number of clusters to 9.
3 After applying the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm, we selected the optimal model and the number of clusters based on a comparison of Bayesian information criteria.
To complement our results, we also carried out calculations for a larger, unbalanced panel that includes countries for which scores are available only for part of the period that we are analysing. These results are presented in Appendix C.
Reform trajectories
Overall trends and developments Figure 1 shows how the two disability policy dimensions developed over time. We can observe a marked increase in the integration dimension over this period (111.4 points on average between 1990 and 2014) and a more moderate but steady decrease in the compensation dimension (25.7 points). Table 1 indicates that this change in orientation, with a shift from the compensation to the integration dimension, was supported by changes in almost all subcomponents of the two policy indicators. Among the compensation subcomponents, the only subcomponent that increased on average was population coverage (X1). This reflects that a few countries, such as Spain and Poland, extended the coverage of their social protection systems in the 1990s. Of the remaining compensation indicators, those that declined most refer to benefit permanence (X5), medical and vocational assessment criteria (X6 and X7), as well as sickness absence certification (X10). Taken together, the scores indicate that countries decreased the compensation dimension of their disability policy (and thus the generosity of social protection) primarily by tightening the inflow into benefit programmes. The benefit levels underwent comparatively small changes.
Among the integration subcomponents of disability policy, the strongest reforms concerned employer obligations (Y3), where the average score increased from 1.25 to over 3 points. Only two out of 20 countries did not undertake any reform of their disability policies in this dimension. In most cases, the change was minor. Strong changes can be observed for The Netherlands, the UK and Sweden, where this score increased by 3 points. Programmes and benefit complexity (Y2) were also significantly reformed. Coordination of all -or, at least, most -of the programmes and benefits was achieved in all Scandinavian countries (particularly in Norway through the reform of the Labour and Welfare Organisation (NAV) and the creation of 'one-stop shops'), as well as in Australia and in the UK. Other subcomponents of integration policy that increased strongly document the strengthening of supported employment programmes (Y4), earlier and more flexible timing of vocational rehabilitation (Y8) and the introduction of options for disability benefit suspension (Y9).
Figures 2 and 3 plot individual countries' changes in the two aggregate dimensions. Almost all countries reduced the generosity of their protection systems, indicating a broad, albeit heterogeneous, retrenchment. The only exceptions were Ireland and Canada where no changes for the compensation dimension were recorded. All countries strengthened the integration dimension of their disability policies, although in some countries (such as Spain, Belgium and the USA) the reforms changed the scores only lightly. 4 Looking at the overall reform intensity, we see that The Netherlands underwent by far the largest changes in sickness and disability policy. In the next sections, we discuss these as well as some other salient reforms, differentiating between changes that took place until 2007 and those that were implemented more recently and were not included in the original OECD data set.
Salient reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s
When we look at the compensation dimension, we can detect a number of instances of retrenchment that were implemented already in the mid-and late 1990s. (See also Table 2.) Norway tightened its vocational assessment criteria in 1994 and Luxembourg both its medical and the vocational assessment criteria in 1996. In that same year, Finland restricted the possibility to access permanent disability benefits. In 1998, Denmark introduced a sickness absence monitoring process while also reducing the generosity of disability benefits. In The Netherlands, stricter vocational assessment criteria were introduced in 1993. Further changes occurred in 1996, 1998 and 2002, when the monitoring of sickness absences was successively strengthened (Bockting, 2007) . In several instances, the reductions in the compensation dimension were part of broader pension system reforms aimed at reducing early labour market exits. This was the case in Spain in 1997, when the disability assessment system was reorganised at the same time that the generosity of the old-age pension system was reduced (Garc ıa-G omez, Jim enez-Mart ın, & Vall Castell o, 2012) . In Italy, too, a major reform of the social security and particularly the pension system was implemented in the 1990s, mainly through three reforms in 1992 , 1995 and 1997 (Brugiavini & Peracchi, 2012 .
We can find similar instances of retrenchment in the following years. Switzerland introduced stricter medical assessment criteria as part of its fourth revision of the Disability Insurance Act Welfare to Work reforms, with the aim to tighten the criteria for benefit eligibility. With respect to the integration dimension, we can observe a broad and very heterogeneous set of policy changes (See also Table 3 .) The common denominator of most reforms is the effort to support and incentivise employment, streamline benefits and programmes, and increase the involvement of employers and medical professionals in the labour market (re)integration of workers with health problems. Particularly, The Netherlands as well as Finland, Norway, the UK and Australia took multiple steps to support employment and improve the job retention of workers with health problems. Finland accompanied its continuous pension reform process with parallel efforts to promote occupational safety and work ability through programmes such as the Workplace Development Programme and its extension (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , and the National Programme on Ageing Workers (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . To encourage early identification and early intervention, rehabilitation was defined as a subjective legal right for employed workers who are at risk of losing work-capacity (OECD, 2008) . The most characteristic element of the Norwegian reform process was its strong reliance on social dialogue. Starting in 2001, the government signed a series of tripartite inclusive workplace (IW) agreements with the social partners, which aimed to reduce sickness absences and improve the job retention of workers with health problems. These agreements shifted the focus of the monitoring and reintegration process to the Whereas in Norway employers continued to be involved on a voluntary basis, The Netherlands pursued a strategy to compel employers to take an increasingly active role in preventing sick and disabled workers' exits from the labour market, and in their reintegration into the labour market. One central element of this strategy was the introduction and successive extension (up to a period of 2 years) of mandatory wage payments for sick workers by the employer. These monetary incentives were accompanied by a host of measures to improve employment support and rehabilitation programmes. Arguably, the most important step was the introduction of the so-called 'Gatekeeper protocol' in 2002. The centrepiece of this protocol was a 'reintegration' plan drafted by the employer and the employee (De Jong, Lindeboom, & van der Klaauw, 2011) . A stronger involvement of employers was also the goal of a reform implemented in 2001 in Germany, which mandated firms to contact employees on sick leave for a longer period of time and to offer them support for their return to work.
Australia implemented substantial policy changes aimed at the working-age population with health problems in the early 1990s and a set of more limited changes in 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2004 . These reforms increased employer obligations, intensified the use of subsidised and sheltered employment programmes and introduced benefit suspensions to incentivise the return to employment. They also reduced programme complexity and improved the consistency across different programmes.
The main changes in the integration dimension for the UK are related to the implementation of the New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) and the Pathways to Work programme. The NDDP was first piloted in 1998 and extended nationally in 2001, and Pathways to Work was piloted in 2003 and rolled out nationally in 2005 (Burkhauser et al., 2014; DWP, 2007) . These programmes were aimed at supporting people on incapacity-related benefits in securing employment, slowing the inflow of disability beneficiaries and boosting outflows for recent beneficiaries. Mandatory work-focussed interviews were a central component of these programmes.
The most recent changes
A review of disability policy changes that were implemented in OECD countries after 2007 indicated two elements of continuity. Reforms continued to focus on stricter screening and benefit eligibility, expanded employment integration measures and employment incentives, required greater involvement of employers and medical professionals and improved the institutional set-up and coordination. However, numerous reforms, particularly among the substantial ones, were introduced in countries that had already undergone significant reforms in previous years and overall, reform activity was unevenly distributed across countries. Several countries, such as the USA and Belgium, continued to be characterised by no or only moderate policy changes in this field.
The UK and Sweden implemented substantial reforms in 2008. The UK introduced its new Employment and Support Allowance, which replaced three different benefits 5 , as well as a new and stricter assessment procedurethe Work Capability Assessment (Burkhauser et al., 2014; Morris, 2016 Similarly, Norway developed an online tool that makes it possible for physicians to compare their sickness certification practice against all other physicians', supporting them when assessing future patients (OECD, 2015a) . In 2011, it also introduced stricter rules for the follow-up on sick employees, including sanctions for employers and employees who do not comply (Hagelund & Bryngelson, 2014; OECD, 2012) . In 2014, Denmark adapted its sickness benefit scheme, too, shortening the timeline for the assessment of sickness benefit extension to 22 weeks (from 52 weeks). It also restricted the access to disability pension benefits for those aged under 40 and increased the requirements for older persons to take part in a rehabilitation programme before becoming eligible for the benefit.
Far-reaching changes were implemented also in Australia and New Zealand. Australia reformed its assessment process for the Disability Support Pension (DSP) in 2011 and 2012, increasing its focus on a person's potential to work with appropriate capacity building and rehabilitation, as well as revising its impairment tables (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010 Australia, , 2016 . In addition, DSP recipients under 35 years of age had their eligibility reviewed against the revised impairment tables and are now required to participate in yearly interviews and activities with a focus on employment. At the same time, to incentivise the return to employment, new rules allowing DSP recipients to work more hours without losing their benefit were introduced.
6 New Zealand initiated several changes related to the Social Security Amendment Act of 2007 and the introduction of new benefit categories (Jobseeker Support, Sole Parent Support and Supported Living Payment) in 2013. Overall, these changes increased the pressure on working-aged benefit recipients to take up employment.
Reform activity was not confined to the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon area. In 2012, Switzerland implemented the first part of its sixth revision of the Disability Insurance Act. This reform was targeted at the disability benefit caseload and consisted of measures to incentivise the return to employment of benefit recipients (OECD, 2014). More significant changes had previously been implemented in 2008 as part of the fifth revision, which introduced measures to strengthen vocational rehabilitation as well as to tighten disability benefit eligibility. Austria reformed its disability insurance system in a similar fashion in 2014, abolishing disability pensions for younger workers and implementing a more stringent rehabilitation process. In 2011, Austria had also established an informational and consulting service (fit2work) to identify and support workers with a heightened risk for disability. 7 We found examples of changes also in other countries. In most cases, however, these changes represent instances of limited rather than systemic reform. In Spain in 2010, social security contribution exemptions were introduced for firms that offer training opportunities to persons with disability. Belgium, too, introduced additional incentives for sickness and disability beneficiaries to take up training and vocational rehabilitation programmes. Since 2009, the costs of the training have been covered by the Social Insurance Agency, without limitation on the length of the programme or the cost (conditional on previous approval) (OECD, 2013c). In 2011, Spain also raised the mandatory quota for people with disabilities in new public sector appointments from 5% to 7% (Bolet ın Oficial Del Estado, 2011) and in 2013, it passed a law (Royal Decree 1/2013) to consolidate previous legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities (Bolet ın Oficial Del Estado, 2013). Italy, in 2013, mandated employers to provide reasonable accommodation at the workplace for workers with disabilities (Legislative Decree 76/2013). The Austrian model resembles the system introduced in Germany (Betriebliches Eingliederungsmanagement) in 2001, but it is less binding and does not assign the responsibility for re-integration efforts to employers. 8 Other changes were introduced more recently, and fall outside our observation period. This is the case for new guidelines for targeted employment of persons with disabilities which were included in the Italian reform of labour laws adopted in 2015, or for a French law (D ecret n8 2014-1386) that became effective in 2015 and specifies mandatory provisions for employers that want to be exempt from the obligation to employ disabled workers. Not unlike the changes that we could document for the period up to 2014, however, these reforms are prevalently of limited scope. For 1990, we identified only two clusters, one (with the exception of France, included in this cluster with a lower level of statistical significance) consisting of the Anglo-Saxon countries associated with the 'Liberal' welfare state regime, and one 'residual' cluster which comprises all remaining (European) countries. For 2000, the data identified another small cluster, composed of three Scandinavian countries. This 'Social-democratic' or 'Nordic' cluster expanded over time: in 2007, it also included Germany, Finland and The Netherlands. Based on the most recent data, we also included Switzerland in this cluster.
As we can see from the detailed data for the cluster mean scores (Table C1 in Appendix C), the 'Nordic' cluster is characterised by the highest scores on almost all integration subcomponents. The most notable exception in this respect is indicator Y10, which captures work incentives for benefit recipients and is thus a 'workfarist' policy element, where the 'Liberal' countries score very high. At the same time, the 'Nordic' cluster exhibits the highest mean scores also for the subcomponents in the compensation dimension. Despite some reductions in generosity, the 'Nordic' countries still have high sickness (X8) and disability (X4) benefit levels, particularly when compared with the mean levels in the 'Liberal' cluster. They also have higher levels of coverage (X1) and more generous provisions with respect to benefit eligibility and medical assessment (X2 and X6). The only compensation subdimension in which the 'Nordic' cluster consistently has low scores concerns the monitoring of sickness absences (X10), reflecting a long-standing tradition of efforts to use sickness absences as an early warning indicator for long-term health problems.
The 'Liberal' cluster is composed of countries that, on average, have the lowest scores in almost all compensation subdimensions, regardless of the specific year we are looking at. When we focused on the integration dimension, however, we could observe a significant shift over time. The mean scores on these subcomponents were low in 1990 but increased over time. According to the most recent data, the 'Liberal' countries now score highest not only in the Y10 (work incentives) but also in the Y9 (benefit suspension options) and the Y4 (supported employment) policy dimensions. In contrast to the 'Nordic' countries, their policies for supported and sheltered employment (Y5 and Y6) as well as for vocational rehabilitation programmes (Y7) are, however, less developed.
The 'residual' country cluster is composed of countries with a lower reform intensity and, accordingly, less variation in score means (at least when we look at the period 2000-2014). These countries are characterised by intermediate compensation levels, with a high mean on the X7 dimension, reflecting a strong weight on occupational status in the assessment of benefit eligibility. The scores on the integration dimension are significantly lower than in the 'Nordic' countries and they have fallen back over time compared with the other clusters. The gap with the countries in the 'Nordic' cluster is particularly pronounced with respect to the score subcomponents Y7 and Y8, indicating a lack of policy measures to ensure timely and comprehensive rehabilitation interventions, as well as Y9, referring to benefit suspension options in case of return to employment.
Our findings provide support as well as further insights with respect to the hierarchical clustering analysis carried out by the OECD (2010). The results They do, however, also show that these three distinctive policy clusters were not present at the beginning of the observation period, but emerged as a consequence of reform activity. The element of novelty consists of a group of countries which, over time, developed a peculiar combination of policies to support labour market participation of persons with health problems, while maintaining comparatively high levels of social protection. The membership of this new cluster increased because, after 2000, more countries with well-developed social protection systems strengthened their policy focus on the integration dimension. These shifts can be traced back to reforms such as the institutionalisation of disability management in Germany in 2001, the introduction of the 'Gatekeeper protocol' in The Netherlands, and the Swiss revision of disability insurance. We also found some fluctuation between the 'Liberal' and the 'residual' clusters in our data, concerning mainly Australia and New Zealand. Our findings did not change when we used the unbalanced panel with all available countries instead of the balanced panel for 20 countries. (See Table C2 in Appendix C). Both the number of clusters and the classification of the countries from the smaller sample were unaffected.
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The additional Eastern European countries are all included in the third 'residual' cluster. On a cautionary note, it is important to remember that the OECD policy scores do not capture all dimensions of change in sickness and disability policy. For instance, several countries intensified their efforts to increase the utilisation of graded (i.e., partial) sick-leave models, which are not covered by the subcomponents.
11 Furthermore, other types of change, such as the extension of the number of waiting days that Ireland established for its illness benefits in 2014, are not captured by the OECD scores.
In addition, in some cases, changes cannot be projected onto the policy scores even when the corresponding policy dimension has been covered.
Germany, for instance, boosted supported employment when it introduced a legal definition for this form of activation measure in Social Law. Since it already has the maximum number of points in the relevant score dimension (Y4), this change is not reflected in the index. The same is true for The Netherlands, which in 2010 reformed its programme to assist young disabled persons and further strengthened the monitoring of long-term sickness absences. Moreover, in certain countries, such as Italy and Belgium, measures and services to support persons with disabilities are implemented at a regional or local level, and cannot easily be quantified in terms of overall country scores. This is also the case of Canada, where a trend towards devolution to the provinces and territories of federal programming and innovation in the areas of working, learning and living with a disability has been observed (Prince, 2016) .
Policy contexts
The scaling back of the compensation dimension of disability policy can be interpreted against the backdrop of a vast literature on welfare state retrenchment. 12 In accordance with the neo-functionalist argument, we see in several instances that policy changes and their timings were associated with a high level of internal 'problem pressure', i.e., high and/or increasing benefit enrolment rates. This was the case for The Netherlands, where sickness and disability rates were considered the highest in the world (the so-called 'Dutch Disease'; see Einerhand & Swart, 2010) . Similarly, the reforms in the UK in the mid-1990s and those in Switzerland, Norway and Australia in the following decade can be interpreted as efforts to contain costs driven by high and/or increasing expenditure levels.
The functionalist view can, however, explain only part of the retrenchment processes that have taken place in recent decades. As pointed out by Morris (2016) , for instance, this theoretical approach is not adequate to understand the cutbacks in Britain's disability benefit programme in 2008, nor does it explain the lack of reform in the USA. Sweden is another interesting case in point, because large-scale retrenchment took place only recently (2008), although the benefit enrolment and expenditure levels were already exceptionally high in the early 1990s. 13 Moreover, we did not observe any simple correlation 9 The OECD clusters Switzerland together with the Scandinavian and Northern European countries in 2007, rather than in the 'residual' cluster as we do. The categorisation of Switzerland depends exclusively on the classification of the fifth revision of invalidity insurance: We adapted the scores to reflect that the revision became effective in 2008, rather than in 2007 as in the original OECD data. 10 With the exception of the categorisation of France in 1990, which is characterised by a lower level of statistical significance. 11 In Finland, the option for graded sick-leave, which had been introduced in 2007 with a restriction on long absences (more than 60 days), was extended to shorter absences (more than 14 days) in 2010 (Kausto, Svetlana, Virta, & Viikari-Juntura, 2012) . In Norway, graded sick-leave was encouraged by the IW agreements.
12 For a survey of this literature and the main theoretical arguments, see for instance Starke (2006) and . 13 Sweden implemented several changes to its sickness benefit scheme during the 1990s; these were, however, of limited scope (see Andr en, 2003; Johansson, Laun, & Laun, 2014) . between crisis dynamics and reform activity. In accordance with Van Kersbergen, Vis, and Hemerijck (2014), we did not find that after the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 retrenchment was 'the only game left in town', nor did we observe more policy changes in those countries for example, Italy, Spain and Ireland, all three of which were hit hardest by the crisis.
In addition to reform pressure, the timing and extent as well as the specific design of policy changes thus reflected other factors related to institutional settings and the policy making decision process. This is particularly true when we look at changes in the integration dimension of disability policy. Following an institutionalist perspective, we may find numerous examples of path-dependency in reform activity. For instance, the strong focus on rehabilitation and support for labour market reintegration, which we observe in the Scandinavian countries, can be linked to the long tradition of publicly supplied welfare services and activation measures in these countries (Scharle et al., 2015) . The Southern European countries, in contrast, have a much weaker tradition of employment support and activation policies -and have maintained mostly a medical approach to disability, concerning both benefit assessment and rehabilitation (European Association of Service providers for Persons with Disabilities, 2016a,b) . This is consistent with a focus on policy instruments such as hiring quotas and subsidised employment schemes. On a different note, Morris (2016) has recently identified the structural arrangements of the Social Security Disability Insurance in the USA and its placement as a social security programme as key factors that protected the programme from retrenchment.
A further element to understand reform dynamics concerns the public support for welfare programmes that target sick and disabled persons as well as the broader understanding of the role and functions of the welfare state. Citizens' support for reform depends to a considerable extent on the perceived deservingness of social categories, and perceptions of deservingness have become increasingly important (Raven, Achterberg, & van der Veen, 2015) . Van Øorschot (2006) identified sick and disabled persons as a category which, at least in Europe, was considered by the public as highly deserving of welfare state support. This perception might help to explain why, with few exceptions, most countries reformed their social protection programmes for persons with ill health by using measures to tighten screening, and thus targeting, rather than by lowering replacement rates. As Bambra and Smith (2010) discussed with respect to the UK, the perception of sick persons as a deserving category might, however, have shifted over time, at least in some countries, with a stronger emphasis on residual work capacity and thus support for benefit conditionality.
Changes in public perception and in the framing of public support can be linked to a broader shift in the conceptualisation of the welfare state. Traditionally, social policy has been associated primarily with social protection through insurance and redistribution, what Barr (2001) called the 'Robin Hood' and 'piggy bank' dimensions of the welfare state. From this perspective, the main function of social policy is to protect individuals against welfare losses resulting from risks such as illness, unemployment or old age. In recent years, welfare states have increasingly been ascribed the function of preventing social risks and supporting employment (Bonoli & Natali, 2012; Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012) . Prevention, activation and protection can thus be viewed as three distinct policy objectives for a 'social investment' welfare state. In this respect, Hemerijck (2015) has differentiated between 'flows' (activation and labour market transitions), 'stocks' (human capital) and 'buffers' (safety nets for social protection). With respect to sickness and disability, we may accordingly distinguish between different sets of measures: those to promote the health status of the workforce and to prevent health impairments; those to activate and reintegrate persons with health problems in employment; and those to provide benefits and other forms of protection to cushion income and welfare losses.
The expansion of policies to support activation and to prevent permanent disability and subsequent labour market exit, which is captured by the OECD integration indicator, can be seen as an expression of a policy shift towards social investment. As we have seen, this shift is, however, not homogeneous across countries. The countries in the 'Nordic' cluster have high scores in both the compensation and integration dimensions, with a strong focus on early intervention, rehabilitation and employment support, and can thus be seen as closest to a social investment approach in disability policy. In the 'Liberal' cluster, there is a stronger emphasis on employment incentives and conditionality for benefit recipients, coupled with lower levels of protection. This is consistent with the 'leaner' interpretation of social investment often associated with the Anglo-Saxon countries .
Summary and conclusions
Earlier research indicated a convergence in sickness and disability policies across countries, despite considerable cross-country heterogeneity in policy design and reform strategies. countries continued to strengthen the activation and the reintegration components of their sickness and disability policies, while at the same time increasing benefit conditionality for working-age persons. In line with previous findings, our results also support the existence of 'three worlds of disability policy', partially overlapping with the 'Liberal', the 'Corporatist' and the 'Social democratic' welfare regime classification in the tradition of Esping-Andersen (1990) .
However, our analyses highlight the fact that the average trends hide a large and possibly increasing degree of heterogeneity across countries, specifically, country groups. Using updated score indicators developed by the OECD and model-based clustering techniques, we investigated the existence of country clusters in sickness and disability policy at four points in time for the period 1990-2014. We found that the number of country clusters in terms of sickness and disability policy increased over time. The Scandinavian countries, which did not form a separate cluster in 1990, emerged as a cluster with a distinctive set of policies characterised by high levels of social protection and strong support for labour market integration, a consequence of intense reform activity during the 1990s. In the following decade, other countries such as The Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, implemented reforms that led to comparable combinations of compensation and integration policies. Key policy reforms increased monitoring and early intervention programmes, strengthened employer obligations to their employees and expanded programmes to support rehabilitation. However, despite these common elements, there exists considerable variation in institutional settings, particularly with respect to the responsibilities of employers and other stakeholders.
Several Anglo-Saxon countries (the UK, Australia and New Zealand) underwent a considerable degree of policy change, too. These countries are characterised, however, by lower and more conditional levels of social protection as well as by stronger emphasis on 'workfarist' policy elements aimed at activating working-aged persons, primarily through incentives and sanctions. The third 'residual' cluster, which consists of Southern, Eastern and some Continental European countries, can be singled out for its low profile in the integration dimension and its moderate reform intensity.
14 In a number of countries, we did not find evidence for significant changes during the most recent period.
This applies also to some countries for which significant 'problem pressure' and reform need had been identified, such as the USA (Autor, 2011; Liebman & Smalligan, 2013) . To understand the policy dynamics behind the reform trajectories (or lack thereof), it is thus necessary to combine neo-functionalist explanations with other approaches that take into account institutional as well as ideational factors. The evolution of the 'Liberal' and the 'Nordic' clusters can tentatively be interpreted against the backdrop of the 'social investment' idea of the welfare state.
Our results point to several avenues for future research. More research is needed to expand the policy indicators developed by the OECD. As we have shown, the OECD indicators at present lack coverage of some aspects that would be useful to obtain a full picture of policy settings in a comparative perspective. Furthermore, the diversity of strategies and reform pathways calls for the investigation of causal reform effects.
The empirical evidence on outcomes associated with particular disability policies and reform steps is growing but still limited. Some of the countries that implemented the most far-reaching reforms were able to achieve visible results in terms of disability rolls and employment rates of persons with health impairments. In Switzerland, the repeated reforms of the Disability Insurance Act have been associated with a 45% decrease in the number of new disability benefit claimants (OECD, 2014) . The radical restructuring of sickness and disability policies has reversed the trend of rising disability receipt rates in The Netherlands (Everhardt & De Jong, 2011; Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, 2013) . The Australian reforms of the DSP led to a noticeable drop in eligible claimants (OECD, 2015b) . 15 It would be misleading, however, to equate high reform intensity and an expansion of the integration dimension with success in terms of higher employment and lower benefit take-up rates for persons with health impairments. Despite its impressive track record of reforms and integration efforts, Norway, for instance, has so far been unable to achieve a reduction of its benefit inflow.
Finally, to assess the reform effects comprehensively, it is necessary to also consider income protection and wellbeing. Evidence for Germany, for instance, indicates that the reforms of the early 2000s and the focus on rehabilitation did lead to falling 14 With the exception of Hungary, which increased the employment-and integration-orientation of its system. Scharle et al. (2015) benefit recipiency rates (Burkhauser, Daly, & Ziebarth, 2016) , but also to a marked decrease in the nominal benefit level for disabled persons (Sternberger-Frey, 2014) . In Sweden, the recent changes have weakened the social security net and increased the risk of poverty for persons with health impairments (OECD, 2013a 
